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abstract: No matter what side one takes in the debate about free will, one will 
also have to accept certain metaphysical assumptions about causation and causal 
laws and, consequently, posit a certain ontological framework. In Causation and 
Free Will, Sartorio develops a compatibilist, actual causal sequence account of free 
will which is grounded on certain controversial features that causation presum-
ably has. In this paper, we argue that those features cannot be jointly incorporated 
adequately into any plausible philosophical account of causation regardless of the 
validity of the thesis of causal determinism, and that they work against one another 
in Sartorio’s account of free will. We argue that no philosophical account of free 
will can establish the freedom of the will without offering a plausible answer of 
how an agent can have a grip on causation.
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Introduction
Free will and causation are two traditional and complex issues within 
metaphysics. There are many positions which one can hold concerning 
the problem of free will, and the same is true for causation. First, one can 
be an incompatibilist and hold that under no conditions are determin-
ism and freedom compatible, so they cannot both be true. On the other 
hand, compatibilists hold that freedom and determinism are compatible, 
while some of them even insist that freedom of the will obtains only if 
determinism is true. Incompatibilists can be either hard determinists, 
who hold that determinism is true and there is no free will and freedom 
of action, or libertarians, who hold that determinism is false and there 
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is free will and freedom of action. We could also add a third position 
on this issue: Those who assert that whether determinism holds or not, 
there is simply no freedom of the will. 
Determinism is sometimes interpreted as causal determinism, and 
the notion of causation is frequently used in discussing various questions 
about free will and the freedom of action, regardless of the position one 
holds. The problem of defining what exactly is causation and what kind 
of things can enter into causal relations has produced a rich and inter-
esting philosophical discussion. Causation is one of the key notions in 
various theories and accounts in the philosophy of science, philosophy 
of mind, and epistemology. It can be said that no one has influenced 
the philosophical debate on causation more than Hume. His work on 
the problem of causation was a starting point for different accounts of 
causation, most commonly associated with regularity and counterfactual 
theories of causation. In opposition to those metaphysical accounts and 
their ontological consequences, which Lewis (1986) famously labelled 
“Humean supervenience”, a new set of theories and accounts have 
emerged since the 1970s, collectively described as a neo-Aristotelian 
approach to causation. There are, however, further elaborated approaches 
to the problem of causation, such as Salmon’s process theory (1984), 
Woodward’s interventionist account (2003), and different causal plu-
ralist accounts, but we should be careful to differentiate metaphysical 
accounts from merely epistemological accounts of causal relations when 
introducing causation into the free will debate.
Still, because of the complexity of these two metaphysical problems, 
many important notions about causation are sometimes only sketched, 
or a certain view of causation is just assumed, because the development 
of the arguments and theories about the freedom of the will do not 
allow going further into the problems of causation, which is, of course, 
reasonable and understandable. For example, compatibilist accounts 
of free will or causalist account of action operate with events as causal 
relata, while the notion of a causal power in the Aristotelian sense is 
crucial for agent-causation theorists. We do not thereby say that there 
are no elaborated conceptions of causality present, but it seems that the 
time has come to go even further. So it seems that taking certain details 
and elaborated features about causation should benefit the free will 
theorists. This is shown by Sartorio (2016). We consider her work as a 
welcome contribution to the debate but, as is usual among philosophers, 
we do not agree with some of her claims. In this article, which primarily 
focuses on her book Causation and Free Will (2016), we try to show how 
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important it is to take more rigorously the metaphysics of causation in 
the debate on free will. We shall follow the path laid by Sartorio, but 
turn to a different side, almost at the first fork.
Causal history of a free act
Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will (2016) is a close study of the inter-
section between the metaphysics of causation and free will, and the 
consequences of that intersection for her compatibilist project. Starting 
with the premise that the agent in a Frankfurt-style scenario (where the 
counterfactual intervener does not intervene) is free, and that all that 
matters for the freedom of the act are the relevant parts of the actual 
sequence of causes that precede the act, Sartorio develops a compatibilist 
account of freedom which rests on the validity of certain features that 
causation presumably has. Although there are similarities between her 
account and the inner/outer mechanism account of Fischer and Ravizza 
(1998), Sartorio argues that their account is burdened by its complexity 
and apparent counterexamples while she offers a simple and more pro-
mising route that, according to her, escapes the counterexamples.
According to Sartorio, what grounds our freedom of action is not 
that we have alternative possibilities at our disposal, but only that the 
actual sequence of causes (the causal history and external factors of that 
causal relation) is of the right kind. In other words, the freedom of a 
certain act supervenes on the causal history of that act: differences in the 
sequences of causes generate differences in freedom. The central tenet 
of Sartorio’s account is therefore the supervenience claim: “No difference 
in freedom without a difference in the relevant elements of the causal 
sequence” (Sartorio 2016: 29). Such a claim, Sartorio argues, could only 
be supported if we assume that the following four features of causation 
hold: (i) absences or omissions can be causal relata (Sartorio 2016: 48), 
(ii) causation is an extrinsic relation (Sartorio 2016: 68), (iii) causes are 
difference-makers (Sartorio 2016: 93), and (iv) causation is an intransitive 
relation (Sartorio 2016: 104).
Each of these features of causation is a matter of dispute in the 
metaphysics of causation and how these issues should be settled is far 
from clear. Furthermore, accepting these four features of causation 
pushes Sartorio away from holding on to any specific or general theory 
or account of causation. In fact, Sartorio claims that even if it turns out 
that causation does not possess all of these features, “some significant 
metaphysical relation (or relations) in which actions and omissions can 
Prolegomena 19 (1) 202080
be involved” or “quasi-causation” (Sartorio 2016: 49) will suffice to gro-
und our freedom and responsibility. We will discuss later in the paper 
whether this is a desirable consequence or not.
In a nutshell, Sartorio’s actual causal sequence (hereafter: ACS) 
account is based on three claims. The first two are about the grounding 
of freedom: there is a positive one, “P”, which states that freedom “is 
grounded, at least partially, in actual sequences” (Sartorio 2016: 18), and 
a negative one, “N”, which states that freedom “is not grounded in any-
thing other than actual sequences” (Sartorio 2016: 18). The third claim is 
the claim of supervenience. At first, the positive claim seems redundant; 
however, P is needed, according to Sartorio, because N is insufficient on 
its own as a grounding claim for freedom, for “it is consistent with the 
claim that freedom isn’t grounded in anything at all” (Sartorio 2016: 19). 
It may be true that there is no complex grounding of the freedom of the 
will. If someone accepts van Inwagen’s claim that freedom of the will is a 
mystery, one perhaps could say that freedom, in the sense of possessing 
the ability to do otherwise under the same antecedent circumstances, is a 
basic fact of the constitution of human beings: that it is a basic brute fact 
of the universe. In that sense perhaps we could really say that freedom 
is not grounded at all. But this does not, at present, change the course 
of the discussion that follows.
In Sartorio’s account, the causes that make up the causal history 
of an act, and which in turn ground the freedom of an act, are only 
the causes of that action, not the causes of the causes of that action. 
Throughout chapters 2 and 3 of her book, she considers several pairs 
of arguments, based on examples, famously discussed by van Inwagen, 
and which seemingly undermine the claim that the freedom of an act is 
grounded in the causal history of that act. Sartorio argues that the four 
features of causation (which are in fact highly controversial!) resolve 
these potential problems for her ACS view. Consider the first pair of 
examples: “Phones” and “No Phones”. 
Phones: I witness a man being robbed and beaten. I consider calling the police. 
I could easily pick up the phone and call them. But I decide against it, out of 
a combination of fear and laziness. (Sartorio 2016: 56)
No Phones: Everything is the same as in Phones except that, unbeknownst to 
me, I couldn’t have called the police (the phone lines were down at the time). 
(Sartorio 2016: 56)
It is commonly understood that the agent in “Phones” is free to call the 
police, and by failing to do so, he can be held responsible for not calling 
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the police. In “No Phones”, it seems that the causal history of the agent’s 
act is exactly the same as in “Phones”, yet the agent is not free to call the 
police since the phone lines were down at the time. Therefore, the agent 
cannot be held responsible for not calling the police. What grounds the 
freedom of an agent to call the police, according to alternative-possi-
bilities accounts of freedom, is that the agent in the first scenario had 
the opportunity to do otherwise. In response, Sartorio argues that the 
act in “Phones” and the act in “No Phones” do, in fact, have different 
causal histories. However, this works only if we accept that omissions 
or absences can be the relata of a causal relation. In “Phones”, my fear 
and laziness caused my failing to call the police by my not trying to call 
the police. In “No Phones”, my fear and laziness could not cause my not 
calling the police since the phone lines were down. The state of the phone 
lines precludes that such a causal relation could obtain, or the state of the 
world is simply such that there could not be a causal relation between 
my not trying to call the police and my failing to call the police. There 
are further examples that Sartorio discusses and they all share a similar 
structure. Prima facie, it seems that the supervenience claim withstands 
these alleged problems.
Since the state of the phone lines is not a part of the causal history of 
my action (or inaction), and yet it seems highly relevant, Sartorio argues 
that this is so because of the extrinsicness of causal relation. She defines 
extrinsicness as follows: “A causal relation between C and E may obtain 
in part, owing to factors that are extrinsic to the causal process linking 
C and E” (Sartorio 2016: 71).
Consider an example of the extrinsicness of causation that Sartorio 
discusses: 
Imagine, for example, the act of redirecting a train from track A onto another 
track B, in a case where the two tracks reconverge shortly before the train reaches 
the station. [...] Although it helps determine the particular way in which the 
outcome is brought about, or the particular causal route to the outcome, it argu-
ably doesn’t cause the outcome itself: the arrival at the station. [...] For imagine, 
now, that the train is redirected to track B in a scenario where track A is dis-
connected (somewhere before the tracks reconverge). In that case redirecting 
the train to track B does cause the outcome of the train reaching the station, 
since the train wouldn’t have reached the station if it had continued on track A. 
(Sartorio 2016: 72-73).
How does this help Sartorio? According to Sartorio, extrinsic factors, 
such as the state of the phone lines, ensure that there will or will not 
obtain some relevant causal relation. Therefore, in “No Phones”, the state 
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of the phone lines simply ensures that my fear and laziness cannot cause 
my failing to call the police. That causal relation cannot obtain because 
of the extrinsic causal factor: the state of the phone lines. We can only 
claim that, in “No Phones”, my fear and laziness caused my failing to try 
to call the police but not my failing to call the police. On the other hand, 
in “Phones”, according to Sartorio, “[m]y not trying to call the police in 
fact causally resulted in my not calling the police” (2016: 78). Therefore, 
it is not true that the agent’s acts in “Phones” and “No Phones” had the 
same causal history but differ in freedom to call the police.
The underlying metaphysics of Sartorio’s ACS account
Causation by absence or causal relation that includes omissions as its 
relata is a highly controversial feature of causation. Many philosophers 
would deny the coherence of the idea that nothingness can be a cause of 
something and that it can be an effect of some event (cf. Beebee 2004), 
or at least would express doubts about the supposed causal efficacy of 
such entities (cf. Dowe 2001). However, leaving aside the controversies 
of causation by absence, the problem for Sartorio arises in supposing 
that if omissions can be causes or effects, they can also be the cause 
and the effect in the very same token causal relation. And this is what 
Sartorio’s difference between “Phones” and “No Phones” amounts to. 
Consider then, the causal claim which Sartorio asserts: “My failing to 
try to call the police in fact causally resulted in my failing to call the 
police.” Both are omissions and are causally connected. Even if we are 
ready to accept that an omission can be causally efficacious or that it 
can be the effect of some event, there is no justification nor any obvious 
step from it to accepting omissions as both cause and effect in the very 
same causal relation. 
What, then, is the connection between failing to try to call the police 
and failing to call the police in “Phones” that makes it a causal relation? 
Certainly, they are somehow connected but we are not presented with an 
explanation that justifies the relation between these two non-occurrences 
as a causal one. Sartorio rightly observes that causation by absence is 
“notoriously explosive” (2016: 33). By accepting absences as causes, we can 
say that one of the causes of my arriving at work today was the absence 
of an alien attack. If we allow that an absence can indeed cause another 
absence, is it the only absence it causes in that case? Does my failure to 
try to pick up the phone and call the police cause my failure to call the 
police, and, in addition, cause my failure to call an ambulance or order 
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a pizza instead? Furthermore, Sartorio states that there is no physical 
process linking my failure to try to call the police with my failure to call 
the police. “C brings about E directly” (Sartorio 2016: 71). There is no 
intermediary event between these two non-occurrences. However, as 
Sartorio fails to point out, these two non-occurrences are not temporally 
contiguous either. My failure to try to call the police and my failure to 
call the police do not occupy different times or make up different events, 
they occur (or non-occur, if you like) simultaneously. They are the facts 
of the same event (or of the same state of affairs) – my not reaching for 
the phone. But this seems highly dubious from the standpoint of the 
metaphysics of causation because there is no theory of causation that 
comes to mind which would allow instantaneous causing of the effect 
by its cause even if we consider facts as causal relata. Nevertheless, recall 
that Sartorio claims that ACS does not need to be grounded in causation 
or tied to some specific theory of causation. So, she claims that quasi-
causation would suffice to ground freedom in this case. But, now, what 
exactly is quasi-causation? What is its relation to causation and how does 
it ground freedom? It seems that it grounds freedom only by possessing 
the aforementioned alleged four features of causation. We shall leave it to 
the reader to conclude whether this is a satisfying, non-circular answer.
To analyze what and how an agent does (or does not do) something, 
in terms of the causation connected with the question of free will, we 
think that we can, and must, ask for an even more fine-grained approach. 
It seems that things can become complicated very soon, so we have to 
tread carefully. First, an agent mentally considers and evaluates his be-
liefs, desires, possible outcomes of possible decisions, and other relevant 
information on the matters about which the agent is striving to make a 
decision. The important question may be also how and when the agent 
acquired the beliefs, desires, and other relevant data about the matters of 
concern and how the outcomes of past decisions and acts (his and other 
people’s) affect his present thinking and striving to decide about certain 
matters. The causal influence of such factors perhaps can influence very 
significantly the outcome and its content. It is also important whether 
there is an unbroken chain of uniquely determining causes which cause 
these beliefs, desires, and intentions, that goes outside of the subject, and 
in such a way that the subject does not have any control over acquiring 
his own mental (both occurrent and non-occurrent, dispositional) states 
and processes. It seems that we have to make a fine-grained specification 
of events, first in order to see what causal powers or factors are indeed 
“up to the agent”, and what strongly, loosely, ceteris paribus, or luckily, 
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does or does not (causally) depend on the agent. It is evident that what 
is in fact relatively simple in intentional terms or for a description at 
the general level, is in causal terms more complex. If we would like to 
get a clear picture, we must define our cases even more specifically, with 
finer distinctions.
Now, we will make some more general observations about the 
“Phones” and “No Phones” scenarios. We can ask what causal powers 
the agent really has and what is causally within the power (control) of 
the agent. Consider the abovementioned example of calling the police. 
How far, in any case, do the (causal) powers of an agent go? Is calling 
the police really fully within the power of the agent? If we specify the 
case in a more fine-grained way, we see that what is within the reach of 
the agent is less than “calling the police” even if the lines do function 
properly. What is within the scope of an agent is to deliberate, to come 
to a decision, to act according to the decision – and, at least here, things 
become complex and murkier. Generally, only mental operations and ba-
sic physical actions are exclusively, or directly, within the causal powers of 
an agent.1 So in a direct “mode”, it seems that the direct causal powers of 
an agent (or direct or basic abilities to cause, or as causes) are to mentally 
operate thoughts and to move his body (including uttering noises, sounds, 
words, sentences, and texts). Then, by carrying out basic actions and (in 
succession or simultaneously) by carrying out basic actions connected 
with or issuing from formed decisions and intentions, the agent does 
other things. These other things are non-basic actions which may or may 
not include objects as tools with and by which human beings do many 
things. But here, the causal powers that seemingly belong to an agent may 
not be enough to ensure that what is intended as a final result is carried 
to its completion. For example, the functioning of the telephone lines 
does not depend on the agent (unless the agent is a telephone electrical 
engineer or a director of a telephone company – and we assume not). 
There, at the interface with the telephone, the direct causal powers of 
the agent stop, and trying to call is the maximum that can be done with 
the agent’s intrinsic causal powers. Therefore, the agent causes calling 
the police only in part. Calling the police depends on factors which are 
not within the agent’s power as well as on those which are. On the other 
hand, the act of trying to call the police is fully caused by the agent, 
because it depends exclusively on the agent’s causal powers.
1 For now, we do not presume there is a continuous causal chain operating like in a de-
terministic world, or, for example, that the agent himself is the source of the “first cause”, as in 
agent-causation.
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Therefore, we can state the following. When the lines function 
properly, my not trying to call the police “ends” in not calling the poli-
ce. When the lines do not function properly, my not trying to call the 
police also “ends in not calling the police.” The difference is only in the 
following: in the first case, the police could have been called if I had 
tried, and in the second case, if I had tried, then the result, not calling 
the police, would have been caused by the malfunctioning of the lines. 
Regardless of the state of the phone lines, an agent can only try to call 
the police. To say it in more picturesque words, what is within the power 
of an agent is to grab the receiver and dial the number. This is what an 
agent can do in both scenarios discussed by Sartorio.2 Of course, if the 
agent knows that the lines do not function, then it would be meaningless 
to try to call the police. But then, there is a completely different causal 
factor for causing the not trying to call the police (and a justifiable one 
if we are assessing moral responsibility: the agent knows, in this par-
ticular case, something which is strongly relevant for the behavior in 
the situation; in this case, about the state of the lines). Many things on 
which we rely are not at all within our power, but they only make ceteris 
paribus conditions: conditions that more or less state that things function 
properly or as usual. Corollary: Agents are responsible for what they can 
do, so in the second case, an agent is responsible in the same way as in 
the first case, even though the lines do not function.3
What, then, explains the fact that I failed to call the police? What 
explains the fact that the police were not called by me? Here is a sug-
gestion. It is a fact that corresponds to a state of affairs in which I am 
not reaching for the phone. Let us call it then a corresponding fact (a 
fact that corresponds to a certain state of affairs but is not caused by it).4 
Moreover, similar corresponding facts for my not reaching for the phone 
to try to call the police are that a man is being robbed and beaten, that 
I did not call the ambulance, or that I did not order a pizza. However, 
these facts or state of affairs are not caused by my not reaching for the 
2 Of course, in some other situations, even trying to call the police would not be in my power. 
For example, assume that the lines function properly even in the following circumstances: there 
happens to be an earthquake at the moment I would like to reach the phone, so instantaneously 
there is a spatial gap made between me and the phone, made by that earthquake, which I cannot 
traverse; or, the telephone is surrounded by armed and strong guards so I cannot go through or 
past them to reach the phone.
3 See Zimmerman (2002) for a similar and, concerning responsibility, more elaborated case.
4 Sartorio uses the term “non-causal consequence” (2016: 81) in an example of a grieving 
widow. Although the murderer caused the death of the widow’s husband, the murderer did not 
cause the widow’s grief.
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phone and not trying to call the police. In Sartorio’s words:
[...] whereas the complete causal history of an action will include the relevant 
thing’s being done, the complete history of an omission will not include the rel-
evant thing not being done, but only the agent’s not doing it. (Sartorio 2016: 92). 
Even if we consider my failing to call the police, the complete history 
of my failing to call the police will only include the fact that I am not 
doing it, and the state of the phone lines seems irrelevant. Again, both 
scenarios, “Phones” and “No Phones”, have the same causal histories.
Causation by absence plays a significant role in Chapter 4 of Sartorio’s 
Causation and Free Will, which is concerned with the reasons-sensitivity 
of the agent and implementing it in ACS. Sartorio argues that the agent’s 
reasons-sensitivity is to be understood as encompassing both acting on 
the basis of the presence of reasons to act, and the absence of reasons 
not to act. Consider the Frankfurt-style case (without the planning 
intervention of a neuroscientist) that Sartorio offers in favor of her 
account: Frank desires to shoot Furt on the basis of reasons that Frank 
has. Nevertheless, Frank would refrain from shooting Furt if he knew 
that Furt has five children; call this reason R. Insensitive Frank, on the 
other hand, also desires to shoot Furt for the very same reasons, but he 
would be completely insensitive to reason R (assume that Insensitive 
Frank is physiologically different from Frank in this relevant way) if it 
was known to him. Both Frank and Insensitive Frank eventually decide 
to shoot Furt for the same reasons, and it seems that their acts share the 
same causal history. However, Sartorio once again introduces causation 
by absence and argues that the two Franks have different causal histories. 
Frank’s causal history involves not only the positive reasons for shooting 
Furt, but also the absence of reason R. The causal history of Insensitive 
Frank’s act, on the other hand, does not involve the absence of reason R. 
The role of the absence of potential causes here is purely counterfactual 
and therefore the actual causal sequence of that act would involve as 
causes, on a par with positive reasons, countless other counterfactual 
possibilities in which the act of shooting Furt does not occur. Does this 
still imply that the only thing that matters for the freedom of an act are 
the actual causes of that act? Sartorio’s answer would be that by reflecting 
on counterfactual scenarios we can find out more about our actual world.
In a deterministic world, however, only one history is possible, so 
the only causal chain which is possible is the actual one, and it would be 
pointless to speak about any other causal chain regarding an assessment 
of the world in which determinism reigns. In a compatibilist world, which 
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embraces determinism, only the actual chain of events is possible: there 
are no other ones possible. The worlds which are fully determined by 
other causal chains, even if we identify the agents as being the same ones 
as in this actual world, are different worlds entirely and they do not reveal 
anything about each other. Each is fully determined in its own special 
way and this means that only one history is possible for each world, so 
only the actual histories which obtain, of these worlds, are possible for 
each of these worlds. Since these histories are, by hypothesis, different, 
these worlds do not say anything about each other; they, then, cannot 
be compared so as to gain any insight into our actual world regarding 
the problem of freedom of the will. Furthermore, if the causal history 
of Frank’s shooting Furt involves the absence of reason R, then it surely 
involves the absence of, possibly, innumerable causes. Also, reason R, 
whose absence is a difference-maker between these two causal histories, 
is, presumably, an arbitrary difference. There could be numerous reasons 
for which Insensitive Frank would refrain from shooting while Frank 
would not. An example would be if Insensitive Frank would refrain 
from shooting Furt provided it were known to him that Furt is a fan of 
a certain sports team.
Conceiving causes as difference-makers does indeed release the 
potential threat to the freedom of an agent in a Frankfurt-style scenario. 
Sartorio (2016: 96) is right in asserting that “an action and the corres-
ponding omission by an agent cannot have the same causal powers.” To 
put it simply, two causal histories of Frank’s choice, one involving the 
presence, and the other involving the absence of reasons, are different. 
However, introducing the extrinsicness of a causal relation to this type 
of cases relieves the casual efficacy of Frank’s reasons or their absence. 
Recall the example of a train’s reaching its destination in either of two 
possible ways. Since Frank will make a certain choice no matter the 
presence or absence of reasons for that choice, the extrinsicness of the 
causal relation puts Frank in the same position as a switch on a railroad 
whose two tracks reconverge. Frank determines the route for the reaching 
of the outcome, but not the outcome itself. Therefore, if causes are really 
difference-makers and their effects do not counterfactually depend on 
them, then it seems right for Sartorio to claim that Frank’s choice in 
the scenario without the involvement of the neuroscientist was free. 
On the other hand, introducing the extrinsicness of causation to this 
case generates a strong opposition to this conclusion without offering a 
satisfying answer, and it seems that Sartorio’s two features of causation 
(or quasi-causation) work against one another.
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There is one further thing about which we disagree with Sartorio. If 
determinism is the case, then, contrary to what Sartorio claims, causation 
is transitive. Namely, if we interpret determinism as causal determinism, 
then there is a unique causal chain that uniquely determines an unbroken 
chain of events – only one history (as well as future) of a determined 
universe is possible. Each and every event is fully and uniquely (cau-
sally) determined: from the first cause there inevitably follows the effect, 
which is then the cause of the subsequent effect, which becomes a cause 
itself, and so it goes for each and every cause and effect in a determined 
world (except the first cause, which is not the effect of a causal chain 
of this determined world, but is an effect of a different sort of cause or 
chance, philosophically speaking). It is like dominoes: you knock down 
the first and all the rest go down inevitably. From the first cause there is 
an unbroken unique chain of causes and effects (until the last member 
or to infinity), where the causation is in fact transitive. The falling of the 
first domino causes the second one to fall. The second one’s falling itself 
becomes the cause of the effect of the third domino’s falling. The third 
domino’s falling now becomes the cause of the fourth one’s falling and 
so, possibly, to infinity or to the last one’s falling. The chain of causes and 
effects transitions from one to another. For example, the last domino’s 
falling is already determined by the first one’s falling through the unique 
and inevitable transition of causation. The first cause causes the last 
by mediate causes. A determined world is in fact only a little bit more 
complicated version of this. Using the cosmological argument of St. 
Thomas Aquinas, we add a little amendment to describe determinism: 
For an earlier member causes an intermediate, and the intermediate causes the 
last (whether the intermediate be one or many). If you eliminate a cause, however, 
you also eliminate its effect. So there cannot be a last cause, nor an intermediate 
one unless there is a first. (Aquinas 2006: 25)
We see that, given determinism, when the first cause obtains, all other 
effects and causes follow, uniquely and inevitably, depending on the 
first cause already: causation moves transitively from the first, through 
intermediaries, to the last (or to infinity). So, the first cause is, through 
intermediates, also the cause of the last (both cause and effect), though 
not perhaps the immediate or proximal cause, but certainly efficient. In 
a deterministic world or in a deterministic causal chain, if A does not 
occur, neither would C (and not B, of course). So, if A is the cause of 
B, and B is the cause of C, then A is also a cause of C. Therefore, it is 
the case that in a deterministic world, there is a transitive relation of 
causation: namely, A causes B and B causes C. 
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Conclusion
Sartorio (2006) offers a refreshing and new approach in developing a 
compatibilist argument in the debate of free will. Although we strongly 
disagree with Sartorio’s answers to potential problems with her account, 
and with her use of highly controversial metaphysical aspects of causation 
to defend it, we consider Causation and Free Will a welcome contribution 
to the debate on free will precisely because of the introduction of these 
controversial aspects of causation, which provide a subject for a rewarding 
and interesting discussion in the metaphysics of causation but have so 
far been largely neglected in the discussion of freedom of the will and 
responsibility. Does Sartorio offer a simple and more promising route 
for actual-sequence accounts? Certainly, her account possesses a simpler 
structure than the other actual-sequence accounts, such as that of Fischer 
and Ravizza (1998). However, contrary to the title of her book, Sartorio’s 
account relies on certain features of some metaphysical relation that, at 
best, only resemble causation. Even if it turns out that those features 
do not work against one another in different cases, as we have argued 
here, it is still not clear how does some metaphysical relation that is only 
relatively close to causation ground the freedom of the will.
To assess whether an agent has genuine freedom of the will and 
freedom of action, we think that, concerning causation, the answer to the 
following question is important: Does the agent have a grip on causation 
or does causation have a grip on the agent? If determinism is true, then 
we would say that causation has a grip on the “agent”5 and it only seems 
that the agent is making decisions: in fact, the agent’s mental chain of 
decision making is governed by causal laws which the agent does not 
control. Causation controls the “agent”. It controls and produces all the 
mental states and events of the “agent”/subject, as well as his actions. The 
“agent”/subject would be, in fact, only a passive observer of what happens 
to the “agent”/subject, though from the first-person perspective it would 
seem as if the “agent”/subject is actively producing his mental events and 
states, as well as his actions that follow; but this is not so: all these are 
products of the operation of deterministic laws in the form of comple-
tely deterministic causation (cf. Pećnjak 2018). Therefore, for genuine 
freedom of the will and genuine freedom of action, the answer should be 
that an agent (to be a real agent) should have a “hold” on causation. We 
5 We put “agent” in quotation marks because we think that in the case of causal determin-
ism, there are no real agents, but rather only (let us say) subjects.
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are aware that this leads us towards a version of agent-causal theory (cf. 
O’Connor 2000, Clarke 2003) or a non-causal theory of freedom of the 
will (cf. Pink 1996, Goetz 2008, Ginet 1990). However, the explication 
of our version of these theories is something for the future.
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